Four Failures of Deliberating Groups by Sunstein, Cass R. & Hastie, Reid
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2008
Four Failures of Deliberating Groups
Cass R. Sunstein
Reid Hastie
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, "Four Failures of Deliberating Groups" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 401, 2008).
CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 401 
(2D SERIES) 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 215 
 
 
FOUR FAILURES OF DELIBERATING GROUPS 
 
Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
April 2008 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1121400 
Preliminary draft 4/8/08 
All rights reserved 
 
 
Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* and Reid Hastie** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many groups make their decisions through some process of deliberation, usually 
with the belief that deliberation will improve judgments and predictions. But deliberating 
groups often fail, in the sense that they make judgments that are false or that fail to take 
advantage of the information that their members have. There are four such failures. (1) 
Sometimes the predeliberation errors of group members are amplified, not merely 
propagated, as a result of deliberation. (2) Groups may fall victim to cascade effects, as 
the judgments of initial speakers or actors are followed by their successors, who do not 
disclose what they know. Nondisclosure, on the part of those successors, may be a 
product of either informational or reputational cascades. (3) As a result of group 
polarization, groups often end up in a more extreme position in line with their 
predeliberation tendencies. Sometimes group polarization leads in desirable directions, 
but there is no assurance to this effect. (4) In deliberating groups, shared information 
often dominates or crowds out unshared information, ensuring that groups do not learn 
what their members know. All four errors can be explained by reference to informational 
signals, reputational pressure, or both. A disturbing result is that many deliberating 
groups do not improve on, and sometimes do worse than, the predeliberation judgments 
of their average or median member.  
 
Many groups make their decisions through deliberation. When private companies 
or public officials are deciding how to proceed, they usually talk the problem through. 
But why, exactly, is deliberation important or even desirable?  
A large part of the answer must be that deliberation will result in wiser judgments 
and better outcomes. But does deliberation actually have this effect? The answer is by no 
means clear. Group members may impose pressures on one another, leading to a 
consensus on falsehood rather than truth. A group of like-minded people, with similar 
predilections, is particularly vulnerable to this problem. The idea of “groupthink,” coined 
and elaborated by Irving Janis, suggests that groups may tend toward uniformity and 
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censorship, thus failing to combine information and enlarge the range of arguments.1 
Much of the time, both private and public groups often blunder not in spite of 
deliberation but because of it. After deliberation, companies, labor unions, and religious 
organizations often make bad decisions; the same point holds for governments.  
One of our principal goals here is to go beyond the idea of groupthink – to 
elaborate on several decades of research that explores the mechanisms that account for 
the failures of deliberating groups. To explain why such groups often do poorly, we 
investigate two sets of influences on members of deliberating groups. The first involves 
informational signals, which lead group members to fail to disclose what they know out 
of respect for the information publicly announced by others. The second involves social 
pressures, which lead people to silence themselves in order to avoid reputational 
sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others. As a result of these influences, 
groups run into four independent problems: 
 
 They amplify rather than correct individual errors. 
 They fall victim to cascade effects, as people follow the statements and actions of 
their predecessors. 
 They tend to end up in more extreme positions in line with the predeliberation 
tendencies of their members (“group polarization”). 
 They emphasize shared information at the expense of unshared information.  
 
Because of these problems, groups often fail to achieve their minimal goal of 
aggregating the information actually held by their members. A confident, cohesive, but 
error-prone group is nothing to celebrate. On the contrary, it might be extremely 
dangerous, both to itself and to others. When groups make poor or self-destructive 
decisions, one of these four problems is often the explanation.  
 
                                                 
1 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 
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Prospects 
 
If deliberating groups do well, we can imagine three principal reasons:  
 
• Groups are equivalent to their best members. One or more group members 
will often know the right answer, and other members might become convinced of this 
fact. For this reason, groups might perform toward or at the level of their best 
members. If some or many members suffer from ignorance or from a form of bias that 
leads to error, others might correct them. Deliberation might correct individual errors 
rather than propagate them, in a way that allows convergence on the judgment of the 
most accurate group member. Imagine, for example, that ten people are trying to 
make some prediction about the future, and that one of the ten is both an expert and a 
superb prognosticator. Perhaps the other group members will quickly see that they 
have an expert in their midst, and they will follow his lead. Consider “eureka” 
problems, in which the right answer, once announced, is clear to all. For such 
problems, groups should be expected to converge on the answer as announced by the 
member who actually knows it. 
 
• The whole is the sum of the parts: aggregating information. Deliberation 
could help to aggregate existing information in a way that leads the group as a whole 
to know more than any individual member does. Suppose that the group contains no 
experts on the question at issue, but that relevant information is dispersed among 
members so that the group is potentially expert even if its members are not. Or 
suppose that the group contains a number of experts, but that each member is puzzled 
about how to solve a particular problem. Deliberation might elicit the relevant 
information and allow the group to make a sensible judgment. In this process, the 
whole is equal to the sum of the parts—the sum of the parts is what is sought–and no 
member has all the parts. When a group is trying to solve a crossword puzzle, 
something of this kind often occurs, as different group members contribute what they 
know. 
 
• The whole goes beyond the sum of the parts: synergy. The give and take of 
group discussion might sift information and perspectives in a way that leads the group 
to a good solution to a problem, one in which the whole is actually more than the sum 
of its parts. In such cases, deliberation is, at the very least, an ambitious form of 
information aggregation, one in which the exchange of views leads to a creative 
answer or solution. If a group is seeking to improve the design of an automobile, a 
tennis racquet, or cell phone – or the right response to a threat to national security -- 
the exchange of ideas might well produce creative solutions that go far beyond any 
simple aggregation of what group members thought before they started to talk.  
 
To what extent do these mechanisms work in practice? Two points are entirely 
clear. First, group members tend to become far more confident of their judgments after 
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they speak with one another.2 A significant effect of group interactions is a greater sense 
that one’s postdeliberation conclusion is correct—whether it actually is or not. 
Corroboration by others increases confidence in one’s judgments.3 Second, deliberation 
usually reduces variance. After talking together, group members tend to come into 
accord with one another. It follows that members of deliberating groups will usually 
converge on a position on which members have a great deal of confidence. This is not 
disturbing if that position is also likely to be correct—but if it is not, then many group 
members will end up sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns out to 
be wrong (a most unfortunate and sometimes quite destructive situation). 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence that deliberating groups will 
usually succeed in aggregating the information held by their members. With respect to 
questions with definite answers, deliberating groups tend to do about as well as or 
slightly better than their average members, but not as well as their best members.4 Hence, 
it is false to say that group members usually end up deferring to their internal specialists. 
Truth does not win out; the most that can be said is that under some conditions, the group 
will converge on the truth if the truth begins with “at least some initial support” within 
the group when the task has “a demonstrably correct answer.”5 (Recall the potential for 
group success with a eureka problem.) Note here that when a group outperforms most of 
its individual members, it is generally because the issue is one on which a particular 
answer can be shown, to the satisfaction of all or most, to be right; and that even in that 
condition, the group might not do well if the demonstrably correct solution lacks 
significant support at the outset.  
                                                 
2 Chip Heath and Rich Gonzalez, “Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence but Not 
Decision Quality: Evidence against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision 
Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 61 (1995): 305.  
3 See Robert Baron et al., “Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology 32 (1996): 537.  
4 Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments,” 
Psychological Bulletin 121 (1997): 149, 161; Reid Hastie, “Experimental Evidence of Group 
Accuracy,” in Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, ed. Bernard Grofman, 
Guillermo Owen, et al. (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 129.  
5 Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” in Judgments, Decisions, and 
Public Policy, ed. Rajeev Gowda and Jeffrey Fox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 116, 121. 
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 In general, simple majority schemes do fairly well at predicting group judgments 
for many decision tasks. More generally, depending on the task, the appropriate statistical 
measure of the central predeliberation tendency – mean, median, or mode – is a good 
description of the group’s integration process. It follows that if the majority is wrong, the 
group will be wrong as well.6 With experts, the same general conclusion holds. Thus a 
“structured approach for combining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate” 
than “traditional group meetings,” which do “not use information efficiently.”7 
 
Two Sources of Self-Silencing 
 
There are two reasons why exposure to the views of others might lead people not 
to share what they know. The first involves the information conveyed by what other 
people say and do. If most group members believe that X is true, there is reason to 
believe that X is in fact true, and that reason might seem to outweigh the purely private 
reason a particular group member has to believe that X is false. If other group members 
share a particular belief, isolated or minority members might not speak out, deferring to 
the informational signal given by the statements of others. In a business or law firm, for 
example, members’ optimism about the likely success of some plan or option might lead 
skeptics to silence themselves on the ground that their own judgments must be ill-
informed of wrong. 
Not surprisingly, the strength of the informational signal will depend on the 
number and nature of the people who are giving it. If the group contains one or more 
people who are well-known to be authorities or who otherwise command respect, then 
other group members are likely to silence themselves out of deference to them. People 
are particularly averse to being sole dissenters.8 If all but one person in a deliberating 
group has said that X is true, then the remaining member is likely to agree X is true, even 
to the point of ignoring the evidence of his own senses. An evident danger here is that 
groups will be deprived of important information. 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  
7 J. Scott Armstrong, “Combining Forecasts,” in Principles of Forecasting, ed. J. Scott Armstrong 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2001), 433.  
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003). 
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The second reason for self-silencing involves social influences. Their silence 
might stem not from a belief that they are wrong, as in the case of informational pressure, 
but instead but from the risk of social sanctions of various sorts. Even in societies and 
organizations that are strongly committed to freedom, those who defy the dominant 
position within the group might incur a form of disapproval that will lead them to be less 
trusted, liked, and respected in the future. Here, too, people are inevitably affected by the 
number and nature of those with the majority position. A large majority will impose more 
social pressure than a small one. And if certain group members are leaders or authorities 
willing and able to impose social sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to 
defy them publicly. 
 Participation in deliberative processes, and the effects of informational and social 
influences, can be put into a more general framework. Suppose that group members are 
deliberating about some factual question; suppose, too, that each member has some 
information that bears on the answer to that question. Will members disclose what they 
know?  
For each person, the answer is likely to depend on the individual benefits and the 
individual costs of disclosure. In many situations, and entirely apart from informational 
and social influences, the individual benefits of disclosure will be far less than the social 
benefits. In this sense, participants in deliberation often face a collective action problem, 
in which each person, following his rational self-interest, will tell the group less than it 
needs to know. At least, this is so if each member receives only a small portion of the 
benefits that come to the group from a good outcome—a plausible view about the 
situation facing many institutions, including, for example, corporate boards, religious 
organizations, and government agencies. 
If the statements of others suggest that privately held information is wrong or 
unhelpful, then the private benefit of disclosure is reduced much more. In that event, the 
group member has reason to believe that disclosure will not improve the group’s decision 
at all. Things are even worse if those who speak against the apparent consensus suffer 
reputational injury (or more). In that event, the private calculus is straightforward: 
Silence is golden.  
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In addition, people show a strong tendency to self-edit when contributing 
information to a group discussion. When people have information that is in tension with 
their own conclusion, they tend not to share that information with others. One study of 
over 500 mock jury deliberations virtually never observed a juror contributing 
information to discussion that contradicted his or her currently preferred verdict.9 
Sometimes this form of self-editing occurs as part of a deliberate strategy to persuade: It 
would be counter to my own interests to provide information that contradicts my own 
conclusions. But this same result can occur when the speaker has the best of intentions. 
Group members are simply not motivated to share information that they have already 
discounted in their personal judgment process – not for instrumental or strategic reasons, 
but because they truly believe that it would be counterproductive to share information 
that they deem false, misleading, or invalid.  
Both informational pressure and social influences help to explain the finding that 
in a deliberating group, those in a minority position often silence themselves or otherwise 
have disproportionately little weight. There is a more particular finding: Members of low-
status groups—less-educated people, African-Americans, sometimes women—speak less 
and carry less influence within deliberating groups than their higher-status peers.10 Both 
informational influence and social pressures, likely to be especially strong for low-status 
members, contribute to this result. The unfortunate consequence can be a loss of 
information to the group as a whole, in a way that ensures that deliberating groups do far 
less well than they would if only they could aggregate the information held by group 
members. Consider the finding that one of the most common defensive tactics for small 
coalition or solo hold-out jurors is to refuse to discuss the case further with other jurors.11  
More generally, a comprehensive study has demonstrated that majority pressures 
can be powerful even for factual questions to which some people know the right 
                                                 
9 See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
10 Caryn Christenson and Ann Abbott, “Team Medical Decision Making,” in Decision Making in 
Health Care, ed. Gretchen Chapman and Frank Sonnenberg (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 267, 273–76.  
11 Hastie et al., supra note. 
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answers.12 The study involved twelve hundred people, forming groups of six, five, and 
four members. Individuals were asked true-false questions involving art, poetry, public 
opinion, geography, economics, and politics. They were then asked to assemble into 
groups, which discussed the questions and produced answers. The majority played a 
substantial role in determining each group’s answers. The truth played a role, too, but a 
lesser one. If a majority of individuals in the group gave the right answer, the group’s 
decision moved toward the majority in 79 percent of the cases. If a majority of 
individuals in the group gave the wrong answer, the group’s decision nonetheless moved 
toward the majority in 56 percent of the cases.  
Hence, the truth did have an influence—79 percent is higher than 56 percent—but 
the majority’s judgment was the dominant one. And because the majority was influential 
even when wrong, the average group decision was right only slightly more often than the 
average individual decision (66 percent versus 62 percent). What is most important is that 
groups did not perform as well as they would have if they had properly aggregated the 
information that group members had. 
 
Let us now turn to the four sets of deliberative failures. 
 
Deliberative Failure 1: Amplification of Cognitive Errors 
 
It is well known that individuals do not always process information well. They use 
heuristics that lead them to predictable errors; they are also subject to identifiable biases, 
which also produce errors.13  
For example, people err because they use the availability heuristic to answer difficult 
questions about probability. How likely is a terrorist attack, a hurricane, a traffic jam, an 
accident from a nuclear power plant, a case of venereal disease? When people use the 
availability heuristic, they answer a question of probability by asking whether examples 
come readily to mind.14 The point very much bears on private and public responses to 
                                                 
12Robert L. Thorndike, “The Effect of Discussion upon the Correctness of Group Decisions: 
When the Factor of Majority Influence Is Allowed For,” Journal of Social Psychology 9 (1938): 
343.  
13 For an overview, see Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
 14 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic For Judging Frequency 
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risks -- suggesting, for example, that people will be especially responsive to the dangers 
of AIDS, crime, earthquakes, and nuclear power plant accidents if examples are easy to 
recall. The point also explains some of the sources of discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, age, and disability. If it is easy to bring to mind cases in which a female employee 
quit work to care for her family, sex discrimination is more likely; so too if it is easy to 
think of cases in which African-American employees performed poorly. 
In this way, familiarity can affect the availability of instances. But salience is 
important as well. A terrorist attack on television will be highly salient to viewers, and 
will have a greater impact than a report about the attack in the newspaper.15 Similarly, 
earlier events will have a smaller impact than later ones. The point helps explain much 
behavior. For example, whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly 
affected by recent experiences.16 In the aftermath of an earthquake, people become far 
readier to buy insurance for earthquakes – but their readiness to do so declines steadily 
from that point, as vivid memories recede. Use of the availability heuristic is not 
irrational, but it can easily lead to serious errors of fact. After the 2005 disaster produced 
by hurricane Katrina in the United States, it was predictable that significant steps would 
be taken to prepare for hurricanes – and also predictable that before that disaster, such 
steps would be quite inadequate. 
Most people also follow the representativeness heuristic, in accordance with 
which judgments of probability are influenced by assessments of resemblance (the extent 
to which A “looks like” B).17 The representativeness heuristic helps explain what Paul 
Rozin and Carol Nemeroff have called “sympathetic magical thinking,” including the 
beliefs that some objects have contagious properties, and that causes resemble their 
effects.18 The representativeness heuristic often works well, but it can also lead to severe 
blunders.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 208 (1973) (discussing availability heuristic).  
15 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 37-48 (London: Earthscan Publications, 2000). 
16 Id. at 40  
17 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” in 
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and 
Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1982, 3. 
18 Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff, “Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and 
Similarity ‘Heuristics,’” in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases p. 201  
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For purposes of assessing deliberation, a central question is whether groups avoid 
the errors of the individuals who comprise them. There is no clear evidence that they do, 
and often they do not—a vivid illustration of the principle, “garbage in, garbage out,” in a 
way that mocks the aspiration to collective correction of individual blunders. In fact, 
individual errors are not merely replicated but actually amplified in group decisions—a 
process of “some garbage in, much garbage out.” 
 Consider some key findings. If individual jurors are biased because of pretrial 
publicity that misleadingly implicates the defendant, or even because of the defendant’s 
unappealing physical appearance, juries are likely to amplify rather than correct those 
biases.19 Groups have been found to amplify, rather than to attenuate, reliance on the 
representativeness heuristic;20 to reflect even larger framing effects than individuals;21 to 
show more overconfidence than group members;22 to be more affected by the biasing 
effect of spurious arguments from lawyers;23 to be more susceptible to the “sunk cost 
fallacy”;24 and to be more subject to choice-rank preference reversals.25 In an especially 
revealing finding, groups have been found to make more, rather than fewer, conjunction 
errors than individuals when individual error rates are high—though fewer when 
individual error rates are low.26 In addition, groups demonstrate essentially the same level 
of reliance on the availability heuristic, even when use of that heuristic leads to clear 
errors.27 
                                                 
19 MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” 116, 121. 
20 Mark F. Stasson et al., “Group Consensus Approaches in Cognitive Bias Tasks,” Japanese 
Psychological Research 30 (1988): 68.  
21 See Norbert L. Kerr et al., “Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups,” Psychology 
Review 103 (1996): 687, 689, 691–93. 
22 Janet A. Sniezek and Rebecca A. Henry, “Accuracy and Confidence in Group Judgment,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 43 (1989): 1. This finding very much 
bears on excessive risk-taking, including in the context of making war. See Dominic Johnson, 
Overconfidence and War, 180–83. 
23 Edward L. Schumann and W. C. Thompson, “Effects of Attorney’s Arguments on Jurors’ Use 
of Statistical Evidence” (unpublished manuscript, 1989). 
24 Glen Whyte, “Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 54 (1993): 430.  
25 James W. Gentry and John C. Mowen, “Investigation of the Preference Reversal Phenomenon 
in a New Product Introduction Task,” Journal of Applied Psychology 65 (1980): 715; Julie R. 
Irwin and James H. Davis, “Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 64 (1995): 325.  
26 Whyte, “Escalating Commitment,” 430.  
27 Stasson et al., “Group Consensus Processes,” 68.  
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Here is an especially disturbing finding, one with great relevance to group behavior 
in both business and politics: Groups are more likely than individuals to escalate their 
commitment to a course of action that is failing -- and all the more so if members identify 
strongly with the groups of which they are a part.28 There is a clue here about why 
companies, states, and even nations often continue with projects and plans that are clearly 
going awry. If a company is marketing a product that is selling poorly, it may well 
continue on its misguided course simply because of group dynamics. (Enron is a likely 
example.) So too with a nation whose economic policy, or approach to foreign affairs, is 
hurting its citizens. 
Why are individual cognitive errors so often amplified at the group level? 
Informational pressures and social influences are unquestionably at work. Suppose that 
most members of a group are prone to make certain errors. If the majority makes those 
errors, then most people will see others making the same errors. What they see will 
convey information about what is right. Those who are not specialists are likely to think: 
If most people make the same errors, maybe they are not errors at all. Social influences 
also play a role. If most group members make errors, others also might make them simply 
in order not to seem disagreeable or foolish. When groups do not correct the blunders of 
their members, this is a large reason. 
To be sure, there is some evidence that deliberating groups can attenuate certain 
biases. We have seen that for eureka problems, groups often do well, even if individual 
members begin with an answer produced by some kind of bias. Groups are also likely to 
do better than the average individual when members are subject to “egocentric bias” – the 
bias that leads most of us to think that other people think and act as we do. Most people 
believe that their tastes and preferences are typical. When asked what percentage of other 
people watch television on Saturday night, enjoy Frank Sinatra, favor a particular 
political party, or believe that the latest Brad Pitt movie will win the Oscar, most of us 
show a bias in the direction that we ourselves favor. But in groups with diverse views, 
people quickly learn that their own position is not universally held, and hence the bias is 
reduced. In these cases, group deliberation supplies an important corrective.  
Or consider the hindsight bias –- people’s tendency to believe, falsely but with the 
                                                 
 28 Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note, at 48. 
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benefit of hindsight, that they would have accurately predicted the outcome of an event 
(an accident, a natural disaster, an illness, a change in the stock market). Compared to 
individuals, groups are slightly less susceptible to hindsight bias.29 Apparently group 
members who are not susceptible to that bias are able to persuade others that it is indeed a 
bias. 
But the broader point is that with group discussion, individual errors are usually 
propagated rather than eliminated, and amplification of those errors is quite likely. When 
individuals show a high degree of bias, groups are likely to be more biased, not less 
biased, than their median or average member. 
 
Deliberative Failure 2: Cascades 
 
A cascade is a process by which people influence one another, so much so that 
participants ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated 
judgments of others. There are two kinds of cascades: informational and reputational. In 
informational cascades, people silence themselves out of deference to the information 
conveyed by others. In reputational cascades, they silence themselves so as to avoid the 
opprobrium of others. 
Informational Cascades. Cascades need not involve deliberation, but 
deliberative processes often involve cascades. The central point is that those involved in a 
cascade do not reveal what they know. As a result, the group does not obtain important 
information, and it often decides badly.30 
To see how informational cascades work, imagine a deliberating group that is 
deciding whether to authorize some new venture.31 Let us also assume that group 
members are announcing their views in sequence, in a temporal queue, and that each 
member knows his place in that queue. Every member has some private information 
                                                 
 29 See generally Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 46 (1995). 
30 The literature here is vast. For a superb summary, see David Hirschleifer, “The Blind Leading 
the Blind,” in The New Economics of Human Behavior, ed. Marianno Tommasi and Kathryn 
Ierulli 188 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
31We draw here on David Hirschleifer, “The Blind Leading the Blind,” in The New Economics of 
Human Behavior, ed. Marianno Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 188, 193–94.  
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about what should be done. But each also attends, reasonably enough, to the judgments of 
others. Mr. Andrews is the first to speak. He suggests that the venture should be 
authorized. Ms. Barnes now knows Andrews’s judgment; it is clear that she, too, should 
vote in favor of the venture if she agrees independently with Andrews. But if her 
independent judgment is otherwise, she would—if she trusts Andrews no more and no 
less than she trusts herself—be indifferent about what to do and might simply flip a coin.  
Now turn to a third member, Mr. Carlton. Suppose that both Andrews and Barnes 
have argued in favor of the venture but that Carlton’s own information, though 
inconclusive, suggests that the venture is a terrible idea. In that event, Carlton might well 
ignore what he knows and follow Andrews and Barnes. It is likely in these circumstances 
that both Andrews and Barnes had reasons for their conclusion, and unless Carlton thinks 
that his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, 
Carlton is in a cascade. Now suppose that Carlton is acting in response to what Andrews 
and Barnes did, not on the basis of his own information, and that subsequent members 
know what Andrews, Barnes, and Carlton did. On reasonable assumptions, they will do 
exactly what Carlton did: favor the venture regardless of their private information (which, 
we are supposing, is relevant but inconclusive). This will happen even if Andrews 
initially blundered.32  
If this is what is happening, there is a serious social problem: Those who are in 
the cascade do not disclose the information that they privately hold. In the example just 
given, decisions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of 
those in the group—even if the information held by individual members, if actually 
revealed and aggregated, would produce a quite different result. The venture will be 
authorized even if it is a terrible idea, and even if group members know that it is a terrible 
idea. The reason is that people are following the lead of those who came before. 
Subsequent speakers might fail to rely on, and fail to reveal, private information that 
actually exceeds the information collectively held by those who started the cascade.  
Note that there is nothing irrational, from the point of view of each group 
member, in following the statements or actions of predecessors; members are reacting 
rationally to the informational signals they receive. Note as well that even when people 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 195. 
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are motivated to discuss an issue vigorously, they often focus on developing the 
statement of their opinions, and not on the evidence that led to those opinions in the first 
place. 
Cascades often occur in the real world within deliberating groups;33 they are easy 
to create in the laboratory. The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the 
experiment was using urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or urn B, 
which contained two white balls and one red.34 Subjects could earn $2.00 for a correct 
decision, and hence an economic incentive favored correct individual decisions. In each 
period, the contents of the chosen urn were emptied into a container. A randomly selected 
subject was asked to make one (and only one) private draw of a ball in each round. The 
subject recorded the color of that draw on an answer sheet and his own decision about 
which urn was involved. The subject did not announce his draw to the group, but he did 
announce his own decision to everyone. Then the urn was passed to the next subject for 
his own private draw, which again was not disclosed, and his own decision about the urn, 
which again was disclosed. This process continued until all subjects had made draws and 
decisions. At that time, the experimenter announced the actual urn used. If the subject 
had picked the urn only on the basis of his private information, he would have been right 
66.7 percent of the time. The point of the experiment was to see whether people will 
decide to ignore their own draw in the face of conflicting announcements by 
predecessors—and to explore whether such decisions will lead to cascades and errors. 
In the experiment, cascades often developed and often produced errors. After a 
number of individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions 
that were inconsistent with their private draws, but that fit with the majority of previous 
announcements.35 More than 77 percent of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15 percent 
of private announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the information 
provided by people’s own draws. Consider cases in which one person’s draw (say, red) 
contradicted the announcement of his predecessor (say, urn B). In such cases, the second 
                                                 
33 See ibid; also see Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent.  
34 See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” American 
Economic Review 87 (1997): 847.  
35 See Angela Hung and Charles Plott, “Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to 
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 
1508, 1515.  
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announcement nonetheless matched the first about 11 percent of the time—far less than a 
majority, but enough to ensure cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the 
announcement of two or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to 
follow those who went before. Of note, the majority of decisions were rationally based on 
the available information36—but erroneous cascades nonetheless developed. Table 4-1 
shows an example of a cascade that produced an inaccurate outcome (the urn used was 
B):37 
 
Table 4-1. An Informational Cascade 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private Draw a a b b b b 
Decision A A A A A A 
Source: Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents,” 291. 
 
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private information 
—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, which was in favor of urn B. 
But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led 
everyone else to fall in line. “Initial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect 
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later.”38 This result 
maps directly onto real-world decisions by deliberating groups, in which people fail to 
disclose what they know, to the detriment of the group as a whole. 
Reputational Cascades. In a reputational cascade, people think they know what 
is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in 
order to maintain the good opinion of others. The problem is not that group members are 
influenced by the information contained in the statements of their predecessors, but they 
people do not want to face public disapproval. “Political correctness” can be found in 
many places; it is hardly limited to left-leaning institutions of education. 
                                                 
36 Thus, 72 percent of subjects followed Bayes’s rule in Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, 
“Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” American Economic Review 87 (1997): 847, and 64 
percent in Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents Able to 
Shatter Information Cascades in the Lab?” in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and 
Behaviours, ed. Patrick Cohendet et al. (New York: Springer, 1998), 291, 304. 
37 See Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents,” 291. 
38 See Anderson and Holt, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” 847.  
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Suppose Albert suggests that global warming is a serious problem and that 
Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually thinks that Albert is right, but 
because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, ignorant or indifferent to environmental 
protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree that global warming is a serious problem, 
Cynthia not only might not contradict them publicly, but also might even appear to share 
their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be correct, but because she 
does not want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion.  
It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, 
Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most 
reluctant to contradict them, even if he thinks they are wrong. In the actual world of 
group decisions, people are, of course, uncertain whether publicly expressed statements 
are a product of independent information, participation in an informational cascade, or 
reputational pressure. Much of the time, listeners and observers undoubtedly overstate the 
extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information. 
The possibility of reputational cascades is demonstrated by an ingenious variation 
on the urn experiment outlined above.39 In this experiment, people were paid $0.25 for a 
correct decision, but $0.75 for a decision that matched the decision of the majority of the 
group. There were punishments for incorrect and nonconforming answers as well. If 
people made an incorrect decision, they lost $0.25; if their decision failed to match the 
group’s decision, they lost $0.75.  
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time! No fewer than 96.7 
percent of rounds resulted in cascades, and 35.3 percent of people’s announcements did 
not match their private signal, that is, the signal given by their own draw. And when the 
draw of a subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2 
percent of people matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, 
table 4-2, which shows this period of the experiment (the actual urn was B):40  
 
                                                 
39 See Hung and Plott, “Information Cascades,” 1515–17.  
40 Ibid., 1516. 
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Table 4-2. Conformity and Cascades 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Private Draw a b b b a b b b a B 
Decision A A A A A A A A A A 
Source: Hung and Plott, “Information Cascades.” 
 
This experiment shows that especially unfortunate results should be expected if 
people are rewarded not only or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing 
what other people do. Unfortunately, many deliberating groups offer such rewards. The 
problem is that people are not revealing the information they actually have. 
Availability cascades. Thus far we have assumed that people are, in a sense, 
completely rational. They are listening to one another and paying attention to the 
informational signals given by their predecessors. True, they care about their reputations, 
but there is nothing irrational about that.  
As we have noted, however, people use heuristics, which can lead them astray, 
and they are also subject to biases. For purposes of understanding how cascade effects 
can go wrong, the most important heuristic involves availability. When a particular event 
is salient, it can lead to availability cascades, which arise as an event becomes 
cognitively salient, and spreads rapidly from one person to another, eventually producing 
a widespread belief.41 
In the area of risk, availability cascades are common. A particular event – 
involving shark attacks, a dangerous pesticide, an abandoned hazardous waste dump, a 
nuclear power accident, an act of terrorism – may become well-known in the public 
mind, even iconic, and if so, it will alter public perceptions of a process, product, or 
activity. In business, availability cascades are also common. A particular event, a 
particular success, or a particular failure may spread like wildfire within or across firms, 
leading to a judgment about other apparently similar events or products. If a movie (Star 
Wars?), a television show (Survivor?), or a book (Freakonomics?), does well, businesses 
will react strongly, looking for a proposal that seems relevantly similar. 
Of course the underlying judgments mihg be correct. But recall that the 
availability heuristic is unreliable: People might know of an instance in which a risk came 
                                                 
41 See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L 
Rev 683 (1988). 
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to fruition, but the instance may not be representative. Pesticides might be safe even if a 
particular pesticide is not; a well-publicized event involving an abandoned hazardous 
waste dump, such at Love Canal, may suggest that abandoned hazardous waste dumps 
are far more dangerous than they are in fact; nuclear power might be safer than the 
alternatives, even if people’s thoughts are dominated by images of the Chernobyl disaster 
or the accident at Three Mile Island. 
Similar errors infect firms. A company might believe that a particular product is 
likely to succeed, because it is like some other product that has succeeded, even though 
the chance of success is low. Television broadcasters often blunder for this reason, 
thinking that because some science fiction show has succeeded, another one will too. Or a 
company might draw an undue inference from some failure, thinking that similar plans 
will fail too. Availability cascades make businesses and government unrealistically 
optimistic about some possibilities and unrealistically pessimistic about others. 
 
Deliberative Failure 3: Group Polarization 
 
There are clear links between social cascades and the well-established 
phenomenon of group polarization, by which members of a deliberating group end up 
adopting a more extreme version of the position toward which they tended before 
deliberation began.42 The problem is especially severe for groups of like-minded people, 
who typically end up in more extreme positions as a result of deliberation.  
Group polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating groups, and it has been 
found in hundreds of studies involving more than a dozen countries, including the United 
States, France, Afghanistan, and Germany.43 For example, those who disapprove of the 
United States and are suspicious of its intentions will increase their disapproval and 
suspicion if they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter 
phenomenon among citizens of France.44  
 The original psychological experiments on the effects of deliberation are relevant 
to businesses and governments alike. They involved risk-taking behavior, with a 
                                                 
42 Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1986), 
206–7.  
43 Ibid., 204. 
44 Ibid., 224. 
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demonstration that risk-inclined people become still more risk-inclined after they 
deliberate with one another.45 Risky decisions include taking a new job, investing in a 
foreign country, escaping from a prisoner-of-war camp, or running for political office. 
With respect to many such decisions, members of deliberating groups became 
significantly more risk-inclined after a brief period of collective discussion. On the basis 
of this evidence, it became standard to believe that deliberation produced a systematic 
“risky shift.” 
 Later studies drew this conclusion into serious question. On many of the same 
questions on which Americans displayed a risky shift, Taiwanese subjects showed a 
“cautious shift.” Deliberation led citizens of Taiwan to become significantly less risk-
inclined than they were before they started to talk. Among American subjects, 
deliberation sometimes produced a cautious shift as well, as risk-averse people became 
more averse to certain risks after they talked with one another. The principal examples of 
cautious shifts involved the decision whether to marry and the decision whether to board 
a plane despite severe abdominal pain, possibly requiring medical attention. In these 
cases, the members of deliberating groups shifted not toward risk but toward greater 
caution.46 
 A straightforward interpretation turned out to able to reconcile these competing 
findings: the pre-deliberation median is the best predictor of the direction of the shift.47 
When group members are disposed toward risk-taking, a risky shift is observed. Where 
members are disposed toward caution, a cautious shift is observed. Thus, for example, the 
striking difference between American and Taiwanese subjects is a product of a difference 
in the pre-deliberation medians of the different groups on the relevant questions. Thus the 
risky shift and the cautious shift are both subsumed under the rubric of group 
polarization. 
Group polarization occurs for matters of fact as well as issues of value, though it 
is easier to demonstrate the latter. If the question is whether a terrorist attack will occur in 
the United States in the next year, group polarization will not be easy to test, simply 
                                                 
45 For a clear discussion, see id. 
46 S. Moscovici and M. Zavalloni, The group as a polarizer of attitudes 12. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 125 (1969). 
47 Id.; Brown, supra note. 
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because the answer is either yes or no, and it is not simple to demonstrate greater 
extremism in binary choices. But suppose that people are asked, on a bounded scale of 
zero to eight, how likely it is that a terrorist attack will occur in the United States in the 
next year, with zero indicating “zero probability,” eight indicating “absolutely certain,” 
seven indicating “overwhelmingly likely,” six “more probable than not,” and five “fifty-
fifty.” In that event, the answers from a deliberating group will tend to reveal group 
polarization, as people move toward more extreme points on the scale depending on their 
initial median point. If the predeliberation median is five, the group judgment will usually 
be six; if the predeliberation median is three, the group judgment will usually be two.48 
Note here that even federal judges are highly susceptible to group polarization, as both 
Democratic and Republican appointees show far more ideological voting patterns when 
sitting with other judges appointed by a president of the same political party.49 Juries 
polarize as well.50 
Why does group polarization occur? There are three reasons.51 The first and most 
important involves the now-familiar idea of informational influence, but in a distinctive 
form. People respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool” 
in any group with some predisposition in one direction will inevitably be skewed toward 
that predisposition. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring the initial position will 
be more numerous than those pointing in the other direction. Individuals will have heard 
of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group deliberation. As a result of 
the relevant arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme point in line 
with what group members initially believed.  
The second explanation involves social influences. People want to be perceived 
favorably by other group members. Sometimes people’s publicly stated views are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a function of how they want to present themselves. Once they 
hear what others believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Investigation of the Federal 
Judiciary (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2005).  
50 See David Schkade et al., “Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift,” Columbia Law 
Review 100 (2000): 101.  
51 Brown, Social Psychology, 200–45. An effort to systematize some of these points can be found 
in Edward Glaeser and Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J Legal Analysis 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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of the dominant position in order to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They shift 
accordingly.52  
 The third explanation of group polarization stresses the close links among 
confidence, extremism, and corroboration by others.53 As people gain confidence, they 
usually become more extreme in their beliefs. Agreement from others tends to increase 
confidence, and for this reason like-minded people, having deliberated with one another, 
become more sure that they are right and thus more extreme. In many contexts, people’s 
opinions become more extreme simply because their views have been corroborated, and 
because they become more confident after learning that others share their views.54 Many 
minds can badly blunder in this way. 
A great deal of work suggests that group polarization is heightened when people 
have a sense of shared identity, and this point helps to suggest yet another explanation of 
polarization.55 People may polarize because they are attempting to conform to the 
position that they see as typical within their own group. If their group’s identity is made 
especially salient, the in-group norms are likely to become more extreme.56 There is a 
further point. If arguments come from a member of an in-group, they are especially likely 
to be persuasive. Such arguments are more likely to seem right. It is also reasonable to 
think that people would fear the social pressures that come from rejecting what an in-
group member has to say. By contrast, the views of out-group members have far less 
force and might even be irrelevant.57 Should you really listen to someone who belongs to 
a group that you believe to be systematically wrong? The reputational pressure will also 
be reduced: Do you really have to worry about rejecting the views of someone usually 
thought to be wrong by people like you? If a self-identified conservative hears arguments 
                                                 
52 Brown, supra note. It has similarly been suggested that majorities are especially potent because 
people do not want to incur the wrath, or lose the favor, of large numbers of others, and that when 
minorities have influence, it is because they produce genuine attitudinal change. See Baron et al., 
“Social Corroboration,” 82.  
 53 See Baron et al., supra note, at 557–59 (showing that corroboration increases confidence and 
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 54 Id. at 541, 546–47, 557 (concluding that corroboration of one’s views has effects on opinion 
extremity). 
 55 See Brown, supra note, at 209–11; Turner, supra note, at 159–70; Cooper et al., supra note, 
at 259, 269–70. 
 56 Brown, supra note, at 210.  
 57 Id. at 211; Cooper et al., supra note, at 269. 
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from someone who is known to be left of center, those arguments are likely to fall on 
deaf ears. The clear lesson is that when a group is highly cohesive, and when its members 
are closely identified with it, polarization is especially likely -- and likely to be especially 
large. 
Does group polarization lead to accurate or inaccurate answers? Do deliberating 
groups err when they polarize? No general answer would make sense. Everything 
depends on the relationship between the correct answer and the group’s predeliberation 
tendencies. If the group is leaning toward the right answer, polarization might lead them 
directly to the truth. It follows that group polarization might not produce errors or failres 
at all. But there are no guarantees here. As a result of the relevant influences, some 
people will fail to disclose what they know. When individuals are leaning in a direction 
that is mistaken, the mistake will be amplified by group deliberation. We have already 
encountered an example: When most people are prone to make logical errors, group 
processes lead to more errors rather than fewer. This is polarization in action, and it 
produces large blunders. 
 
Deliberative Failure, 4: Over-weighting Common Knowledge 
 
The last failure is in many respects the most interesting. Suppose that group 
members have a great deal of information—enough to produce the unambiguously right 
outcome if that information is properly aggregated. Even if this is so, an obvious problem 
is that groups will not perform well if they emphasize shared information and slight 
information that is held by one or a few members. Unfortunately, countless studies 
demonstrate that this regrettable result is highly likely.58  
“Hidden profiles” is the term for accurate understandings that groups could but do 
not obtain. Hidden profiles are, in turn, a product of the common-knowledge effect, 
through which information held by all group members has more influence on group 
judgments than information held by only a few members.59 The most obvious explanation 
                                                 
58 Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Hidden Profiles: A Brief History,” Psychological Inquiry 
14 (2003): 304.  
59 Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and 
Group Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 959.  
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of the effect is the simple fact that as a statistical matter, common knowledge is more 
likely to be communicated to the group; but social influences play a role as well. 
Hidden Profiles. Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both 
face-to-face and online.60 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might 
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates applying for a 
marketing manager position were placed before group members. The attributes of the 
candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for 
the job described. Packets of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset 
of information from the resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant 
information. The groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some 
operating online.  
Almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously the right 
choice! The reason is simple: They failed to share information in a way that would permit 
the group to make that choice. Members tended to share positive information about the 
winning candidate and negative information about the losers. They suppressed negative 
information about the winner and positive information about the losers. Hence, their 
statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add 
complications and fuel debate.”61 
Or consider a simulation of political elections, in which information was parceled 
out to individual members about three candidates for political office, and in which 
properly pooled information could have led to what was clearly the best choice, candidate 
A.62 In the first condition, each member of the four-person groups was given most of the 
relevant information (66 percent of the information about each candidate). In that 
condition, 67 percent of group members favored candidate A before discussion and 85 
percent after discussion.63 This is a clear example of appropriate aggregation of 
information. Groups significantly outperformed individuals, apparently because of the 
                                                 
60 See Ross Hightower and Lutfus Sayeed, “The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication 
Systems on Biased Group Discussion,” Computers in Human Behavior 11 (1995): 33.  
61 Patricia Wallace, The Psychology of the Internet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 82.  
62 See Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision 
Making: Biased Information Sampling during Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 48 (1985): 1467.  
63 Ibid., 1473; see also Stasser and Titus, “Hidden Profiles,” 304.  
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exchange of information and reasons. Here, then, is a clear illustration of the possibility 
that groups can aggregate what members know in a way that produces sensible outcomes. 
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored candidate A was 
parceled out to various members of the group so that only 33 percent of information 
about each candidate was shared. As the condition was designed, the shared information 
favored two unambiguously inferior candidates, B and C; but if the unshared information 
emerged through discussion, and were taken seriously, candidate A would be chosen. In 
that condition, less than 25 percent of group members favored candidate A before 
discussion, a natural product of the initial distribution of information. But (and this is the 
key result) that number actually fell after discussion, simply because the shared 
information had disproportionate influence on group members.64 In other words, groups 
did worse, not better, than individuals when the key information was distributed 
selectively. In those conditions, the commonly held information was far more influential 
than the distributed information, to the detriment of the group’s ultimate decision.  
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that when “the 
balance of unshared information opposes the initial most popular position . . . the 
unshared information will tend to be omitted from discussion and, therefore, will have 
little effect on members’ preferences during group discussion.”65 It follows that “group 
decisions and postgroup preferences reflect the initial preferences of group members even 
when the exchange of unshared information should have resulted in substantial shifts in 
opinion.”66 Nor does discussion increase the recall of unshared information. On the 
contrary, its major effect is to increase recall of the attributes of the initially most popular 
candidate.67 The most disturbing conclusion is that when key information is unshared, 
groups are “more likely to endorse an inferior option after discussion than [are] their 
individual members before discussion.”68 
The Common-Knowledge Effect. These results are best understood as a 
consequence of the common-knowledge effect, by which information held by all group 
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65 Ibid., 1476. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid.  
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members has far more influence on group judgments than information held by one 
member or a few.69 More precisely, the “influence of a particular item of information is 
directly and positively related to the number of group members who have knowledge of 
that item before the group discussion and judgment.”70 Under conditions of unshared 
information, group judgments have been found to be “not any more accurate than the 
average of the individual judgments, even though”—and this is the central point—the 
groups were “in possession of more information than were any of the individuals.”71  
In a key study, deliberating groups would have lost nothing in terms of accuracy 
if they had simply averaged the judgments of the people involved—a clear finding that 
deliberation may not improve on the judgments of statistical groups.72 The more shared 
information is (that is, the more that it stands as “common knowledge”), the more impact 
it will have on group members before discussion begins—and the more impact it will 
have as discussion proceeds, precisely because commonly held information is more likely 
to be discussed. 
Most of the hidden profile experiments involve volunteer participants from 
college courses. It is natural to ask: Would the same results be found in the real world? 
Affirmative evidence comes from a hiring exercise involving high-level executives.73 In 
this study, no experimenter controlled information about the various candidates. Instead 
the executives’ knowledge arose naturally from their own information searches. As a 
result of those searches, some information was known to all; some was partially shared; 
and some was uniquely held. Even with high-level executives, common information had 
a disproportionately large impact on discussions and conclusions. Disproportionately 
little weight was given to valuable information held by one person or a few. 
The same study offers an additional finding of considerable importance. Some 
group members are “cognitively central,”74 in the sense that their knowledge is shared 
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with many other group members. What they know, other people know as well. A 
cognitively central group member is defined as one who possesses information in 
common with all or most group members. But other group members are “cognitively 
peripheral,” in the sense that their own information is uniquely held; what they know is 
known by no one else. Well-functioning groups need to take advantage of cognitively 
peripheral people. But it turns out that cognitively central people usually have a 
disproportionate influence in discussion – and they also show higher levels of 
participation in group deliberations. By contrast, cognitively peripheral people end up 
having little influence and do not much participate.  
A simple explanation for these results is that group members prefer to hear 
information that is commonly held – and prefer to hear people who have such 
information. Cognitively central people also have high levels of credibility; cognitively 
peripheral people have corresponding low levels. And indeed, the executives who were 
cognitively central ended up having a greater influence on the final report. The general 
conclusion is that when some group members count for more than others, it is often 
because they know what everyone else knows. Unfortunately, more peripheral people, 
with unique knowledge, are sometimes the ones group members most need to hear. 
As might be expected, a group’s focus on shared information increases with the 
size of the group.75 For this reason, groups can go very badly wrong even if they are 
fairly large. In a study designed to test judgments about candidates for office, involving 
both three-person and six-person groups, all group discussions focused far more on 
shared information than on unshared information—but the effect was significantly greater 
for six-person groups. Most remarkably, “it was almost as likely for a shared item to be 
mentioned twice as it was for an unshared item to be mentioned at all.”76  
It follows that for very large groups – twelve people, thirty people, two hundred 
people – the effect of shared information will be compounded. And despite the failures of 
their deliberations, group members tended to be significantly more confident about their 
judgments after discussion – an especially alarming finding, because confidence and error 
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are a bad combination. 
Hiding profiles. Why do hidden profiles remain hidden? The principal 
explanations build on the informational and social influence accounts emphasized thus 
far. When information is held by all or most group members, it is especially likely, as a 
statistical matter, to be repeated in group discussion, and hence more likely to be 
influential than information that is held by one person or a few. There are two different 
points here. First, information held by all or most group members is likely to influence 
individual judgments, and those judgments will in turn affect the judgments of the group. 
Second, shared information, simply because it is shared, is more likely to be explored 
during group discussion. 
Suppose that a team of five people is advising the President whether to embark on 
military action to combat a perceived threat. If each of the five people has information 
indicating that the use of military force would be successful, that information is more 
likely to emerge in group discussion than are separate parcels of information, individually 
held by each adviser, suggesting that the use of force would run into trouble. If the team 
of advisers stresses the information that is held in advance by each, that information will 
have a disproportionate influence on its ultimate decision. This is a simple statistical 
point. 
But hidden profiles remain significantly more hidden than would be predicted by 
statistics. To understand the additional element, consider the finding that low-status 
members of groups are “increasingly reluctant over the course of discussion to repeat 
unique information.”77 Those in the group who are inexperienced, or are thought to be 
low on the hierarchy, are particularly loathe to emphasize their privately held information 
as discussion proceeds. It follows that in a business, leaders are unlikely to receive the 
views of those who do not have much experience or respect, even if they know 
something important. 
This finding suggests that group members, and especially lower status ones, are 
nervous about emphasizing information that most group members lack. Indeed, lower 
status members “are likely to drop unique information like a hot potato”—partly because 
of the difficulty of establishing its credibility and relevance, and partly because they risk 
                                                 
 77 Id. 
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the group’s disapproval if they press a line of argument that others reject. Return here to 
the finding that cognitively peripheral members have little influence on the group. Those 
who have uniquely held information end up participating less than those who have shared 
information, and what they have to say is not much valued. In many deliberating groups, 
people who emphasize uniquely held information take an obvious social risk; and they 
know it. 
This point creates a big problem for such groups, which will fail to get 
information that they need, and which can therefore be lead to error. Consider the finding 
that group members typically underestimate the performance of low-status members and 
typically overestimate the performance of high-status members, in a way that gives high-
status members a degree of deference that is not warranted by reality.78  
In the same vein, those who discuss shared information obtain rewards in the form 
of an enhanced sense of competence in the eyes of others—and in their own eyes as 
well.79 Strange but true: If someone tells you something you already know, you are likely 
to like that person, and yourself, a bit better as a result. In face-to-face discussions and 
purely written tasks, people give higher ratings (in terms of knowledge, competence, and 
credibility) both to themselves and to others after receiving information that they knew 
already. It follows that someone with valuable, unshared information may do best to earn 
credibility “by telling others what they already know before telling them what they do not 
already know.”80 The general problem is that deliberating groups often perform poorly 
because they fail to elicit information that could steer them in the right directions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our goal here has been to catalogue four common failures of deliberating groups. 
(1) Sometimes individual errors are amplified, not merely propagated, as a result of 
deliberation. (2) Groups fall victim to cascade effects, as the early speakers or actors 
ensure that people do not learn what is known by their successors. (3) Because of group 
                                                 
 78 Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Social Status and Group Structure, in Group Processes, supra note 93, 
at 352, 354 (collecting studies). 
 79 See Gwen M. Wittenbaum et al., Mutual Enhancement: Toward an Understanding of the 
Collective Preference for Shared Information, 77 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 967, 967–78 
(1999). 
 80 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note, at 311. 
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polarization, members of deliberating groups often end up in a more extreme position in 
line with their predeliberation tendencies. (4) In deliberation, shared information often 
dominates or crowds out unshared information, ensuring that groups do not learn what 
their members know. 
As we have seen, informational signals and reputational pressure help to explain 
all four errors. A disturbing result is that groups often do not improve on, and sometimes 
do worse than, their average or median member. A crucial important task, for many 
deliberating groups, is to devise strategies that will overcome the relevant problems and 
increase the likelihood that group judgments will take advantage of the knowledge held 
by group members. We have not said anything here about how that task might be 
accomplished.81 Our goal has been instead to isolate the problems to which deliberating 
groups are subject, and to understand the mechanisms that threaten to make those 
problems so difficult to solve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 csunstei@law.uchicago.edu 
                                                 
81 These issues will be explored in detail in Hastie and Sunstein, Smart Groups, supra note; some 
tentative thoughts can be found in Sunstein, Infotopia, supra note. 
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